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Making Every Dollar 
Count: A Summary 
Imagine you’re a program officer 
at a foundation devoted to 
reducing poverty.  You get the joy of 
investing in projects that improve people‘s well-
being. You‘re also in the painful position of 
turning down projects that could improve 
society, or even save lives. Deciding where to 
allocate resources can be nerve-wracking at 
best, heartrending at worst. There‘s an 
abundance of worthy causes and a limited 
amount of cash at hand. By saying ―yes‖ to an 
investment, you could deprive another 
worthwhile initiative of funding. How do you 
decide which investments to take on?  How can 
you make every dollar count? 
Faced with nearly infinite need but decidedly 
finite resources, philanthropies consistently 
grapple with the challenges of funding 
allocation. Does influencing trade negotiation 
deserve more money than teaching children to 
read?  What about improving how government 
funds are allocated in impoverished countries?   
To make matters worse, it‘s difficult to get 
accurate information about projects‘ potential 
benefits, let alone compare the value of diverse 
investments. 
In spite of these challenges, the desire to do as 
much good as possible has always driven 
philanthropies to ask tough questions of 
themselves when comparing potential grantees. 
What is the ultimate goal? What are the most 
effective ways to reach that goal? How much is 
it going to cost? These questions are as old as 
philanthropy itself. What is often missing is a 
systematic method of answering them.  
Enter Expected Return, a consistent, 
quantitative process for evaluating potential 
investments. Although still in its infancy, 
Expected Return has the potential to help 
maximize the return on scarce resources. 
Flexible, dynamic, and applicable to a broad 
range of topics, Expected Return asks and 
answers the right questions for every 
investment portfolio:  
► What’s the goal? 
► How much good can it do? 
► Is it a good bet? 
► How much difference will we make?  
► What’s the price tag?  
The first section of this paper presents the 
preliminary benefits of using Expected Return 
to systematize a philanthropy‘s grant-making 
process. 
Section two describes the Expected Return 
calculation, which is comprised of four 
components (Figure 1): benefit in a perfect world, 
likelihood of success, the philanthropy’s contribution, 
and cost. The result is a systematic estimate of 
the return on each potential investment and the 
ability to compare disparate projects. 
Section three shows how Expected Return will 
become more robust through better estimation 
techniques and new applications. 
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A quick note on the case example used 
throughout the paper: In early 2007, the 
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation decided 
to experiment with the use of Expected Return 
in its grant making. 
In choosing a test case, Hewlett looked for a 
program that would push the method‘s limits 
by posing difficult-to-quantify investment 
decisions.  Fortunately the Foundation‘s Global 
Development program, which pursues the 
ambitious and complex goal of global poverty 
reduction, volunteered.  Established in 2004 ―to 
promote equitable growth in the developing 
world,‖ the Global Development program 
spends more than $60 million a year on a wide 
variety of initiatives aimed at reducing poverty.  
Of course the Hewlett Foundation recognized 
that Expected Return is no panacea: its results 
are only as accurate as the professional 
judgments and assumptions that drive them. All 
involved acknowledged that the early 
applications of Expected Return described in 
this paper greatly simplified complex elements 
of the estimation process (for example, how to 
quantify interdependencies between 
investments and how to discount costs and 
benefits).  
Still, Expected Return delivered a valuable 
process for identifying strategies.  It provided 
structure – in a complex social science setting – 
in which Program Officer judgment could be 
codified and applied consistently across 
investment decisions. 
It helped the Global Development program 
move toward preliminary quantification of the 
returns to different strategies. Consequently, 
program officers can now quantify high-level 
tradeoffs between investments. The next step is 
to add ground-level, grant-specific 
measurement and fine-tuning.  
The Hewlett Foundation‘s experiment with 
Expected Return reflects a longstanding 
commitment to improvements in the execution 
of philanthropy, and a strong belief that 
foundations are responsible for ensuring that 
their investments maximize benefits to society. 
While still in the early days, the experiment with 
Expected Return is clearly helping the 
Foundation in its commitment to make every 
dollar count.  
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1. Why It’s Worthwhile 
Reaping the Benefits of Expected Return 
So many causes, so little funding… Expected Return helps 
channel investment dollars in the most promising direction by 
improving the way in which programs choose strategies and 
program officers make grants. Following a consistent process for 
identifying high-return initiatives helps stretch philanthropic 
resources and refine investment portfolios. 
 
Expected return is a quantitative tool for 
comparing potential investments; it‘s a process 
of systematically drawing on existing knowledge 
to facilitate clear decision-making. Rather than 
trying to replace professional expertise or 
eliminate tough judgment calls, Expected 
Return provides a consistent method for 
bringing out the best from available 
information and resources. 
 
Incorporating Expected Return in the Hewlett 
Foundation‘s Global Development program 
systematized the process of choosing the right 
investments, and led to a portfolio 
characterized by the following: 
► The best opportunities – Expected Return 
provided a method to go beyond the faddish 
investments of the day. It systematically 
identified cost-effective investments, and 
down-graded those with low returns to 
philanthropic intervention.  
► Overarching goals – Grant-making 
strategies have to be as multi-faceted as the 
problems they seek to tackle. Expected 
Return drew complex, diverse strategies 
together under a single, measurable goal with 
a standard metric of success.  
► Rigorous grant-making – Expected 
Return‘s quantitative nature limited grant-
making biases and made explicit previously 
unidentified risks and unspoken 
assumptions, changing the way program 
officers think about grant-making. 
► Maximum global impact – Expected 
Return helped the program find the optimal 
geographic scope, balancing global and in-
country investments to most effectively 
reach target populations.  
Each of these four benefits is described in more 
detail in the sections that follow. 
The best opportunities 
Identifying and omitting low-return 
investments frees up funds to be spent on 
higher-return investments. Expected Return 
helped the Global Development program 
highlight and eliminate dozens of low-return 
investments. This improved the investment 
portfolio by:  
► Rejecting the wrong initiatives. Some 
investments weren‘t logical for Hewlett to 
pursue. For example, some experts 
suggested that school feeding programs in 
developing countries would have high 
impact. However, large organizations with 
enormous means, such as the United 
Nations World Food Programme, are likely 
to be more effective in the highly 
decentralized arena of district- and 
community-level feeding efforts than an 
individual philanthropy. 
In other cases, investments that were 
comfortable because they drew on existing 
knowledge proved to be less attractive than 
alternatives that stretched into new territory.  
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Thus Expected Return helped to avoid the 
risk that ‗when you have a hammer, you tend 
to look for a nail‘. 
► Reducing duplication of effort. Expected 
Return helped eliminate strategies that 
already receive significant investment. For 
instance, providing microcredit has been 
shown to raise incomes in some settings, but 
a recent spate of microcredit initiatives is 
already addressing many high-return 
opportunities.  
► Reallocating funds to overlooked 
initiatives. Transparency and accountability 
efforts have historically received little 
funding because of limited understanding 
about their link to poverty reduction. 
However, recent research shows that 
improved governance can dramatically 
improve the lives of the poor, and that 
philanthropy has high potential to effect 
change in this field. Expected Return 
analysis estimated high returns to 
investments in this area, bolstering the 
Global Development program‘s decision to 
be at the leading edge of this movement. 
Indeed, in many cases Expected Return 
highlighted the unique role that philanthropy 
can take by assuming greater risk, but 
potentially reaping far greater returns, than 
other more conservative institutional 
investors. 
Focusing on the best opportunities doesn‘t 
mandate putting all resources into the highest-
return strategy. Rather, it aims to help a 
philanthropy make educated decisions on how 
to diversify investments. Many grantees are 
only able to productively absorb a limited 
amount of funding at any one time. 
Furthermore, strategies often produce 
diminishing returns on larger amounts (e.g., the 
second $1 million spent on some investments 
may have a smaller effect than the first). 
Diversification also mitigates the consequences 
of misestimation of benefits or of investment 
risk. 
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Overarching goals 
Expected Return has helped the Global 
Development program see how a diverse set of 
strategies contribute to a unified, measurable 
goal. A program officer trying to choose 
between increasing the quality of education and 
influencing trade negotiations will find the task 
almost impossible without a common yardstick 
for evaluating both strategies. Explicitly linking 
all categories of investment to the overarching 
aim of reducing poverty has helped 
grantmakers focus on the program‘s ultimate 
outcome and given them a tool for achieving it. 
Expected Return, first, requires the translation 
of missions and (sometimes vaguely-worded) 
goals into quantifiable metrics and targets. 
Through the Expected Return process, the 
Global Development program began by 
discussing their objectives during a multi-day 
workshop, and ultimately decided to set goals 
of doubling the incomes of people living on 
less than $2 per day (Figure 2) and increasing 
human well-being as measured by a multi-factor 
index. Although two investments might result 
in very different accomplishments – say, 
influencing infrastructure throughout Africa 
versus increasing government transparency in 
an individual country – Expected Return allows 
these very different results to be compared 
based on their shared ability to reduce poverty 
and increase well-being.   
Rigorous grant-making 
Expected Return‘s ability to organize expert 
opinions and research to better ferret out 
opportunities has helped program officers think 
differently as they weigh potential investments.  
By assembling standardized, thorough, and 
explicit assumptions, Expected Return 
ultimately reduces potential biases in grant 
selection and makes grant-making more 
rigorous.  The resulting documentation can be 
examined, challenged, and updated, and 
consequently leads to better decisions by:  
► Making assumptions explicit: Program 
officers often have a deep understanding of 
their field and potential grants, and this 
knowledge is implicit in the decisions they 
make. However, by making assumptions 
explicit, Expected Return documents views 
that can be compared, across diverse 
strategies.  
► Reducing unidentified risk: In the 
absence of an explicit calculation of 
likelihood of success, it‘s common to focus 
on impact alone. Making the expected 
probability of success explicit can help 
manage and mitigate program risk.  
► Quantifying tradeoffs and goals: By 
translating diverse programs into a 
comparable metric, Expected Return 
provides a tool for quantifying tradeoffs 
between investments and a concrete measure 
of success for grantees.  Because the process 
is dynamic, decisions can be reevaluated as 
assumptions are updated based on field 
experience, and failing strategies can be 
eliminated when appropriate.   
Maximum global impact 
During the first few years of its life, the Global 
Development program engaged in exploratory 
grantmaking based primarily on research in 
relevant fields, professional judgment, and 
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expert recommendations. Its goal was to 
gradually develop strategic plans for future 
grantmaking. As a new program with limited 
staff, it emphasized research and advocacy 
strategies that could achieve global impact by 
influencing decision-making, particularly within 
the United States.  
As the program grew, it sought to deepen the 
impact of its grantmaking in the developing 
world.  The program used Expected Return to 
help identify an optimal combination of global 
strategies, which can have wide-spread impact, 
and local strategies, which can be well-targeted 
toward key populations.  
Although the Global Development program 
maintained its investments in some high-return 
global strategies, it also systematically narrowed 
its local focus to a handful of countries in a few 
regions where it believes it can have significant 
impact, based on need, political stability, and 
positive implementation conditions. It further 
narrowed the scope of particular strategies to 
sub-sets of these countries where impact is 
expected to be highest (Figure 3).  
Limiting local investments to a specific set of 
countries helped maximize the program‘s 
impact. It also yielded practical program 
advantages, allowing the Foundation to begin 
to develop country-specific expertise, link 
projects on the ground, and streamline travel.  
Conclusions 
In essence, Expected Return is a way of 
documenting intended philanthropic impact. Its 
method is to make the evaluation of individual 
investments systematic and consistent. By 
quantifying the goals, benefits, risks, and costs 
of potential investments, Expected Return 
changes the way program officers approach 
grant evaluation by reducing biases, making 
assumptions explicit, and creating consistency 
across program areas. 
The chapter that follows explains how it works; 
it describes the process of Expected Return. 
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2. How It Works 
The Process of Expected Return 
The previous section touched on the benefits of Expected 
Return. Now it’s time to focus on the process. Expected 
Return translates five key philanthropic questions into a mathematical 
equation:   
 
Calculating Expected Return is the process of 
translating existing ideas and knowledge into 
consistent, quantifiable forms. Expected Return 
answers five questions – one program-wide and 
four investment-specific – using information 
from program officers, field experts, academic 
research, data, and past experience.  
► What’s the goal? Target defines the topical 
and geographic scope of all potential 
investments and the metric used to measure 
them. 
► How much good can it do? Benefits in a 
perfect world measures an investment‘s 
potential results under ideal conditions. 
► Is it a good bet?  Likelihood of success takes 
risk into account.  
► How much difference will we make?  The 
philanthropy’s contribution describes the 
philanthropy‘s share of impact within a 
potential investment that includes other 
sources of funding.  
► What’s the price tag?  The cost expresses 
the size of a philanthropy‘s financial 
investment.  
This chapter explains how to define each of 
these variables and then how to calculate 
Expected Return using a specific case from the 
Global Development program: governance 
reform in Nigeria.  
 
What’s the goal? Defining the 
target 
Target describes the ultimate outcome the 
program is trying to achieve, and defines the 
geographic and topical scope in which that 
outcome is to be achieved. The Global 
Development program used Expected Return 
to narrow investment options from an initial 
goal of reducing poverty anywhere in the 
developing world. The first step in calculating 
Expected Return was to quantify and define the 
scope of the program-wide task in more detail.  
a. Choose a yardstick – Before impact can be 
estimated, the program needs to decide on a 
metric. Creating a standard metric can be the 
most difficult step in calculating expected 
return, because it defines the yardstick by 
which the success of each investment is 
ultimately measured. 
The choice of a metric can strongly influence 
the specific investments that are eventually 
selected. The Global Development program 
approached this choice by reviewing 
measures used by other organizations 
focused on development (e.g., the United 
Nations and the World Bank), and refining 
them to fit its particular needs.  
In the end, the Global Development 
program focused and quantified their 
mission of equitable growth and their 
general goal of reducing poverty to 
measuring the equivalent number of people 
living on less than $2/day whose incomes 
doubled as a result of Hewlett‘s efforts. 
The program also tracked a multi-
dimensional metric dubbed the Hewlett 
Global Development Index (HGDI) that 
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included literacy and health indicators, as 
well as income. This choice reflected the fact 
that although health and education outcomes 
are strongly linked to income, some 
investments can increase income without 
causing commensurate increases in well-
being for the poorest members of society.  
For instance, using HGDI as an indicator 
revealed that some policy investments that 
increased incomes substantially were 
concentrated on middle-income people in 
wealthier countries. As a result, the 
investments did not contribute to the well-
being of the poor living on less than $2 per 
day as substantially as other investments 
with similar average income increases. The 
difference between the HGDI and income 
rankings brought out this nuanced 
distributional effect of investments.  
b. Define the geography – Unless a particular 
philanthropy has the time and resources to 
evaluate every potential investment in every 
country in the world, an important step in 
calculating Expected Return is setting 
geographic boundaries on the consideration 
of strategies.  
The Global Development program 
considered the possibility of working in 95 
countries with significant poor populations. 
The program compared countries based on 
three criteria that were analyzed using a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative 
measures.  The criteria were: economic and 
overall need; political stability; and positive 
implementation conditions. Once these 
filters were applied, the pool was narrowed 
to investments in 16 countries. The selected 
countries still encompassed 40 percent of 
the world‘s 2.9 billion poor people. 
c. Define the playing field – The Global 
Development program began the Expected 
Return process by creating a theory of 
change and logic model for each category of 
investment under consideration – quality 
education, government transparency and 
accountability, and markets and trade – and 
brainstorming all possible poverty reduction 
strategies that contributed to the theories of 
change. It then discussed strategies internally 
and consulted with experts in the field to see 
if other strategies should be included, and to 
further narrow the range of investments it 
would consider.   
How much good can it do? 
Estimating benefits in a perfect 
world 
Benefits in a perfect world measures the many 
different outcomes of potential philanthropic 
investments – new irrigation systems, 
vaccinated children, reduced carbon emissions. 
To ensure consistency, these benefits are 
expressed in the single metric chosen above for 
all investments under comparison. 
Benefits are estimated by identifying and 
quantifying the links between an investment 
and the desired outcome, often based on 
previous research. For instance, improving the 
quality of education by investing in teacher 
training can increase student literacy, which in 
turn may lead to increased productivity, more 
job opportunities, and higher wages later in life.  
The Global Development program‘s Expected 
Return analysis drew on academic research on 
the relationship between education and income 
to quantify the benefits of such an investment. 
This allowed for consideration of direct 
benefits (e.g., education leading directly to 
higher incomes) as well as indirect benefits (e.g., 
education leading to improved health leading to 
higher incomes).  
Is it a good bet? Estimating 
likelihood of success  
Likelihood of success reflects the inevitable 
presence of risk.  It takes into account three 
components that are combined to provide a 
risk estimate (Figure 4): 
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a. Strategic accuracy: Likelihood that the 
hypothesis linking the strategy to the 
expected outcome is correct. 
b. Grantee success: Likelihood that grantees 
will have sufficient internal capacity, 
coordination ability, and influence to 
succeed. 
c. External conditions: Likelihood that the 
political and economic conditions necessary 
for success will be in place. 
When possible, probability estimates should be 
based on documentary evidence from similar 
situations. Alternatively, interviewing experts in 
the field can serve as a source of information.  
Over time, refinements can be made to the 
probability estimates by incorporating 
additional data and expert opinions as strategies 
mature. The Global Development program 
estimated probability of success based both on 
interviews with experts, and on its own 
experience and the experiences of others with 
past investments.  
How much difference will we 
make? Estimating a 
philanthropy’s contribution 
A philanthropy’s contribution is the extent to which 
a specific philanthropy‘s share of a collective 
investment is responsible for driving the 
outcome. By measuring philanthropic 
contribution, a philanthropy can be sure its 
own investments will really make a difference. 
Philanthropic contribution combines two 
components:  
a. Financial contribution: Percentage of an 
individual organization‘s contribution 
relative to the overall philanthropic 
contribution needed to achieve the outcome. 
b. Degree of influence: How essential the 
investment is to achieving the outcome. This 
measure can result in philanthropic 
contribution that is greater than the level of 
financial share (if the philanthropy is 
providing substantial leadership, for 
instance), or can result in contribution that is 
less than financial share (if the philanthropy 
is relying on the leadership of others, and is 
contributing little other than money). 
Since there‘s no obvious equation for weighing 
financial contribution and degree of influence, 
philanthropic contribution is tricky to estimate. 
Is a small financial investment combined with 
large political influence a bigger contribution, 
or vice versa? A grant that is small compared to 
the total cost of a project might be the tipping 
point needed to achieve the desired outcome. 
Similarly, an organization‘s expertise in a field 
might be a more powerful driver of success 
than its financial contribution.  
Estimations of the philanthropy‘s contribution 
in the Global Development program relied on 
program officers‘ judgments and experience, 
and expert opinions on what was needed to 
drive the intended change. The program 
considered factors such as the success of similar 
grants in the past, the number of other players 
involved (e.g., other philanthropies, 
international organizations, national 
governments), whether the program had any 
particular expertise or political influence to 
offer, and what others were doing or planned 
to do.  
Determining the exact impact of an individual 
philanthropy can be difficult. Yet, provided that 
over- or under-estimation remains consistent, 
the relative return of potential investments in 
comparison to one another will remain 
accurate. And while imprecise, the effort to 
estimate contribution can help program officers 
justify extra leadership efforts in some cases, 
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and can help them avoid possible temptation to 
‗cherry pick‘ grants that accomplish little that 
would not have occurred in any event. 
What’s the price tag? Estimating 
cost 
Cost is estimated based on past grants and 
expected grantee requirements. The cost of an 
investment has two components: 
a. Program cost: Cost to implement a specific 
strategy (e.g., carry out an advocacy 
campaign, develop new curriculum 
materials) 
b. Overhead cost: Cost to run the 
organization and to administer the grants 
(e.g., office space, staff salaries) 
Because the total cost of an investment may be 
spread across multiple funders, only the share 
borne by the individual philanthropy in 
question is considered.  
The Global Development program estimated 
costs based on similar past interventions and 
country-specific data. For instance, program 
costs for quality education investments were 
based on a combination of academic 
evaluations of programs similar to Hewlett‘s 
proposed education grants in India and 
country-level data on students, teacher salaries, 
and class sizes.  
In the Expected Return calculation, all other 
factors are divided by the total cost.  This 
normalizes investments so that they represent a 
cost-benefit ratio, rather than reflecting benefits 
alone. 
The case study 
Because Expected Return calculations can be 
complicated, case studies are a good way to 
illustrate the mechanics. 
The case1 describes an investment considered 
by the Global Development program to 
improve transparency and accountability (T/A) 
in Nigeria (Figure 5).  It is somewhat simplified, 
in that it only considers one of the two targets 
set by the Global Development program – the 
number of poor people for whom income is 
doubled. 
The case is quite typical of the more than 100 
investment categories that were subjected to 
Expected Return analysis by the Global 
Development program. The level of complexity 
and data availability are similar, and the results 
are at the upper-middle of the Expected Return 
pack. 
With that as background, here is the case 
example: 
Despite $50 billion in annual oil revenues and 
$1 billion in annual aid, 92 percent of the 
population of Nigeria (over 120 million people) 
lives in abject poverty. To determine the 
expected value of the proposed T/A work in 
Nigeria, the Foundation relied on the analyses 
                                                 
1 The case study shown here was developed in 
collaboration with Paul Brest and Hal Harvey. 
It appears together with a thorough description 
of several other social-return-on-investment 
calculations in their forthcoming book, Money 
Well Spent: A Strategic Guide to Smart Philanthropy. 
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of development experts and its on-the-ground 
experience supporting similar work in Mexico.  
The ER calculations summarized here yield a 
pragmatic estimate of what the Foundation 
could hope to accomplish in Nigeria with an 
initial commitment of about $30 million for a 
multi-year investment in T/A. 
That amount covers a suite of grants for T/A 
support activities – such as expenditure 
tracking, budget monitoring, and ―citizen report 
cards‖ on the quality of public services – that 
combine with significant investments by fellow 
foundations, multi- and bilateral donors, and 
others. 
Calculating benefits in a perfect 
world 
The benefits in a perfect world were the social 
benefits that would be realized if the proposed 
theory of change were to succeed perfectly. 
Cross-country research by Daniel Kaufmann 
and others at the World Bank and elsewhere, 
suggests that improving governance increases 
gross national income per capita and raises the 
well-being of the very poorest citizens by a 
relatively predictable amount. Based on the 
Foundation‘s experience in Mexico and trends 
in Nigeria, the Program estimated that absent 
risk, the investments by Hewlett and others 
could double the incomes of about eight 
million Nigerians currently living on less than 
$2/day. 
Calculating likelihood of success 
The likelihood of success reflected the fact that 
virtually all philanthropic theories of change 
face strategic, organizational, and external risks, 
and in this case the history of corruption in 
Nigeria exacerbated some of these issues. To 
calculate these risks, the Foundation consulted 
with experts from Nigeria and elsewhere and 
again took into account its own experience, 
particularly with T/A grant making in Mexico. 
Although staff members had initial confidence 
in the proposed strategies, and in potential 
grantees in Nigeria, they acknowledged that the 
theory of change relies on many moving parts 
working together in just the right way.  Taking 
into account all these risks, the Foundation 
gave its theory of change for Nigerian 
governance a 25 percent probability of success. 
Calculating the Foundation’s 
philanthropic contribution 
The Hewlett Foundation‘s contribution was an 
estimate of the portion of success for which the 
Foundation‘s effort could be credited, 
recognized both as the amount of dollars 
invested, and the influence of those dollars. 
Since the theory of change relied on donations 
by other foundations, and many non-
philanthropic investments, Hewlett‘s 
contribution would clearly be only one part of a 
larger effort.  For instance, experience in 
Mexico suggested that an ongoing government 
contribution of more than $200 million in 
present value could be needed just to fund an 
agency to administer freedom-of-information 
requests. All told, compared with other donor 
and government expenditures, Hewlett‘s 
financial share of the theory of change would 
likely be less than five percent.  However, given 
that Hewlett‘s involvement was intended to be 
catalytic, the team estimated Hewlett‘s 
contribution at 10 percent for the purposes of 
the ER calculation. 
Calculating the cost 
The cost associated with the benefits under 
consideration would include supporting NGOs 
engaged in budget and revenue monitoring, in 
expenditure tracking, and in training 
government officials in the implementation of 
freedom of information laws. The costs also 
included the administrative costs involved in 
making, monitoring, and evaluating grants. As 
mentioned earlier, the Foundation‘s theory of 
change required that Hewlett invest $30 million 
during an eight-year period. 
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As described in more detail in section four, the 
Foundation considered, then rejected, the idea 
of discounting this investment using present 
value. However, because all of the investments 
that the Foundation was comparing will operate 
in a similar time horizon, and because there is 
little agreement on an appropriate discount rate 
for efforts to improve human wellbeing, the 
Foundation assumed a zero discount rate. 
Conclusions 
Putting the benefits factors together the 
Expected Return calculation estimated that the 
Global Development program‘s $30 million 
investment in T/A work in Nigeria could 
double the incomes of about 200,000 people 
now living on less than $2/day: 
a. Benefits in a perfect world: 8,000,000 poor 
people double incomes 
b. Likelihood of success: 25% 
c. Hewlett contribution: 10% 
d. Cost: $30 million  
e. Expected benefit: 200,000 poor people double 
incomes 
Thus, according to the ER calculation, every $1 
million that the Hewlett Foundation spent on 
improving T/A in Nigeria would likely 
contribute to the doubling of income for about 
6,700 poor people. When this result was 
combined with credit for improvements in 
wellbeing, the T/A investment in Nigeria 
achieved a score of about 400 against the 
program‘s outcome index. 
Similar analyses for an array of potential 
investments resulted in scores ranging from 
more than 1,200 for supporting impact 
evaluation of public services, to about 50 for 
reforming trade regulation in emerging 
economies such as Brazil and China. With due 
recognition of the imprecision of these 
estimates, the Foundation ultimately decided to 
further investigate a number of strategies with 
ERs of at least 150 (including T/A in Nigeria 
and elsewhere, improving agricultural markets, 
and education in certain developing countries) 
(Figure 6). It also rejected a variety of candidate 
strategies with ERs of less than 150. As we 
write, the Hewlett Foundation is using this type 
of analysis to determine where in Africa to 
pursue certain of these strategies. 
Postscript: Calculating Expected 
Return in dollars per dollar 
invested 
Because the actual measure used by the Global 
Development Program included well-being 
factors that were not measured in dollars, the 
Foundation did not calculate the expected 
return on a per dollar basis for its decision 
making. However, with our simplified example 
this is possible.  Just to close the loop, here‘s 
how one might do this. 
Data suggests that the average income of a 
person in Nigeria living on less than $2/day is 
$644/year, so doubling his or her income 
would yield an annual increase of that same 
amount.  Let‘s assume (conservatively) that the 
person earns this income for 10 years, yielding a 
total increase of $6,440 (not discounted). 
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Referring back to the expected benefit result 
(200,000 poor people with doubled incomes) 
multiplied by the $6,440, we arrive at a total 
expected return of $1.25 billion for a $30 
million investment. This results in an expected 
return per dollar invested of $43 of income, 
which is substantial but perhaps not 
unreasonable considering the risks associated 
with the investment. 
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3 - What’s Next 
New Frontiers for Expected Return 
The Hewlett Foundation’s effort to apply Expected 
Return to one complex philanthropic program is a 
significant first step. Looking forward, three specific 
refinements to Expected Return can increase its utility even 
further: 
 
a. Technical enhancements – Expected 
return can benefit from improving the 
modeling of interdependencies, optimizing 
investment portfolios based on program 
constraints, and discounting future benefits.   
b. In-country assessments – Development 
conditions are often intensely local; 
Expected Return for development 
investments will require detailed in-country 
assessments.   
c. Application to new topics – Expected 
Return analysis can be strengthened by 
learning from applications in other social 
science fields, as well as by test cases in fields 
where more hard science is available.  
Technical enhancements 
As a relatively new analytical tool for the 
philanthropic sector, Expected Return can 
benefit from technical enhancements that will 
more accurately reflect the complexity of 
potential investments. These include: 
► Modeling interdependencies between 
investments - To make more accurate 
tradeoffs between investments, the 
interdependent relationships between 
specific strategies should be reflected within 
Expected Return modeling. For example, an 
investment in keeping teenage girls in school 
might not make the cut based on its direct 
links to educational outcomes, but because it 
also contributes indirectly to population and 
women‘s rights outcomes, its overall value 
for poverty reduction could be much higher. 
Common methods for modeling 
interdependent events include decision trees, 
Bayesian analysis, and compound probability 
analysis. These analyses require detailed 
assumptions of how events are related and 
the probability that they will occur, but even 
modestly improved assumptions can 
enhance the accuracy of Expected Return 
results.  
► Optimizing investment portfolios based 
on costs to foundations - Funding and 
staffing constraints and necessary conditions 
for investment establish boundaries for 
investment decisions, which were only taken 
into account informally in the current 
analysis. Mathematical optimization 
techniques such as linear or integer 
programming can dramatically improve the 
usefulness of Expected Return results where 
there are multiple, conflicting constraints to 
be considered.  
► Discounting future benefits - Financial 
theory tells us that a dollar today is more 
valuable than one received ten years from 
now. For this reason, future cash flows can 
be ―discounted‖ to represent the value lost 
from the deferral of benefits or gained from 
the deferral of costs. In addition, the current 
simplifying assumptions that costs and 
benefits will be affected equally by exchange 
rates and inflation can also become more 
nuanced. 
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As mentioned earlier, this theory can also be 
applied to social investments with the theory 
that helping a person today is better than 
helping a person by the same amount ten years 
from now. However, selecting an appropriate 
discount rate for social investments is extremely 
difficult, and the choice of a rate can have a 
large impact on the relative value of long-term 
investments. Making these assumptions 
transparently is an important enhancement to 
Expected Return.  
In-country assessments 
Increasing the accuracy of assumptions for 
specific investment opportunities is the most 
important improvement that can be made to 
the Expected Return work undertaken to date. 
This is particularly true for potential grants that 
would take place in specific countries or 
regions. Because development conditions are 
often intensely local, detailed assessments at the 
country and regional levels can significantly 
improve the accuracy of assumptions about 
probability, cost, timing, and interdependence.  
This of course will significantly improve the 
accuracy of Expected Return calculations. 
For example, improving student-teacher ratios 
may be a good investment overall in Sub-
Saharan Africa, but it is important when 
targeting the exact location of the investment to 
know that Malawi has over 70 students per 
teacher, while Ghana has only 30. Similarly, 
Mali can benefit from agricultural infrastructure 
investments, but the need is narrowly focused 
in the southwest region – the northeast is a 
desert (Figure 7). Thus, in-country assessments 
are a high priority in improving the ability to 
use Expected Return effectively in comparing 
country-specific development investments.  
Application to new topics 
Sometimes the best way to learn is by doing. 
The Expected Return process was refined 
significantly during its application to the Global 
Development program, which faced a number 
of challenges that made it particularly valuable 
as a test case: 
► Diverse strategies in areas like education, 
trade, and governance made philanthropic 
impact difficult to measure and compare. At 
the same time, the breadth of the program‘s 
goal allowed Expected Return to surface a 
wide range of opportunities, helping the 
program avoid a potential ‗hammer and nail‘ 
problem 
► Multiple and conflicting views of how 
development happens led to challenges in 
formulating clear theories of change and 
logic models. 
► Complex interactions between potential 
investments made it difficult to analyze 
individual initiatives.  
The initial success of Expected Return analysis 
suggests that the method may find new and 
valuable uses in other complex fields such as 
global health, the environment, or even the arts. 
Conclusions 
The use of Expected Return helped the 
Hewlett Foundation‘s Global Development 
program hone its investment portfolio and 
systematize its grant-making. It helped surface 
the best available information for decision-
making, and helped pinpoint where information 
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that should influence decisions was good, and 
where more information would be useful. 
As Expected Return takes on an expanded role 
at the Hewlett Foundation and other 
philanthropies in coming years, its ability to 
make every dollar count will be tested and 
strengthened.  The current implementation of 
Expected Return has significant room for 
growth.  The transformative potential of 
Expected Return analysis, however, is already 
apparent. 
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